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THE ETHICS OF BEING A COMMENTATOR II
Erwin Chemerinsky* and Laurie Levenson**
I. INTRODUCTION
Although it will be many years before all of the effects of
the Simpson legal proceedings are understood, it already is
clear that the media has learned from the case that there is
enormous public interest in trial proceedings. This lesson
hardly should be surprising, as the drama of the courtroom
has been obvious since the trial of Socrates and has been the
foundation for countless classic movies and television pro-
grams, from "Inherit the Wind" to "Perry Mason." Yet, the
prosecution of O.J. Simpson 1 for the murders of Ronald
Goldman and Nicole Brown Simpson received far, far more
media coverage than any case in American, and probably
world, history. The media devoted enormous attention to the
case for a single reason: people were interested in hearing
about it.
The result is that more legal proceedings will receive
much more media attention than prior to the Simpson case.
In the year since the Simpson verdict, there has been sub-
stantial coverage of the retrial of the Menendez brothers for
the murder of their parents, the murder trial of rapper Snoop
Doggy Dog, the trial for the murder of model Linda Sobek,
the rape trial of Alex Kelly, the pretrial and trial proceedings
involving the Oklahoma City bombing and the "Unabomber,"
and the Whitewater investigation. Also, of course, every de-
tail of the continuing saga of O.J. Simpson, in both family
court 2 and in a civil trial,3 has been reported by the media.
* Legion Lex Professor of Law and Political Science, University of South-
ern California.
** Associate Dean and Professor of Law, Loyola Law School.
1. People v. Simpson, No. BA097211, 1995 WL 704381, at *1 (Cal. Super.
Ct. Oct. 3, 1995).
2. In re Guardianship of Sydney Brooke Simpson and Justin Ryan Simp-
son, No. A174254 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 10, 1996).
3. Goldman v. Simpson, No. SC036340, 1997 WL 53038, at *1 (Cal. Super.
Ct. Feb. 10, 1997); Brown v. Simpson, No. SC036876, 1997 WL 53038, at *1
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Media attention to judicial proceedings has not been limited
to high profile criminal, and related civil, cases. A lawsuit
challenging the constitutionality of Proposition 209, a voter
approved initiative abolishing affirmative action in Califor-
nia, has garnered substantial media attention and, with that
attention, a demand for commentary by legal observers.
One striking initial effect of the Simpson case is that vir-
tually none of these proceedings has been broadcast. The les-
son that judges appear to have taken from the Simpson crimi-
nal trial is to keep cameras out of the courtroom.4 Yet, the
coverage of the above proceedings shows that the media will
closely follow cases of interest to the public whether or not
there is a live broadcast.
Such media coverage of legal proceedings inevitably in-
volves the use of a commentator to help explain the events.
Scarcely an article is written about any courtroom events or
any judicial decision without quotations from law professors
and lawyers. Virtually every story on the news about a legal
proceeding has a sound bite from a commentator. Commen-
tators are used to explain the substantive and procedural
law, place particular events in a larger perspective, and to
evaluate the conduct of witnesses, lawyers, and judges.
The absence of cameras in the courtroom has enhanced,
not decreased, the role of the commentator. The pundit be-
comes, in part, the eyes and ears of the public in commenting
on events that people have not seen for themselves. This
makes the task for the commentator far more difficult. With-
out broadcasts, it is much harder for commentators to follow
the events because being in the courtroom becomes the only
way to hear the proceedings. Also, the absence of live radio
and television coverage makes the commentator into a re-
porter as well as an analyst.
(Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 10, 1997); Rufo v. Simpson, No. SC031947, 1997 WL
53038, at *1 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 10, 1997).
4. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper, this is a change we
strongly criticize. Court proceedings are government proceedings and judges
and prosecutors are government officials. The public should be able to observe
and evaluate this important part of their government. A meaningful public
trial in the 1990s requires that it be broadcast because few people realistically
can attend court proceedings. Moreover, we reject the view that cameras inher-
ently distort what occurs in a trial. Quite the contrary, cameras are likely to
cause judges and even lawyers to be more careful and any ill effects can be
cured by judicial control over the proceedings.
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A year ago, following the completion of the criminal trial
against O.J. Simpson, we wrote an article discussing the eth-
ics of being a commentator.5 The events of the past year have
reaffirmed our view that a voluntary code of ethics for com-
mentators is essential.6 These recent developments also have
revealed many problems that we did not consider in our ear-
lier essay. For example, what are the ethical issues when an
attorney who represented one side in a criminal trial then
serves as a commentator in a subsequent civil action involv-
ing the same facts? What, if any, is the commentator's duty
of neutrality? Should the ethical commentator participate in
reenactments of a trial where actors recreate the court's
events? If a trial is not being broadcast, must the commenta-
tor attend the proceedings in order to offer commentary on it?
What is the commentator's duty with regard to trial partici-
pants who are covered by a court's gag order? What actions
should a commentator take if he or she believes that a partic-
ular media outlet is acting improperly or unethically? This
article builds on our earlier work and considers these addi-
tional issues.
As we explained in our earlier article, no current ethical
codes apply to lawyers serving as commentators. Although
attorneys always are obligated to comport with their state's
code of professional responsibility, those rules concern con-
duct in representing clients and are silent about behavior as
a commentator. 7 Journalists' ethical codes are probably un-
known to lawyers serving as commentators and besides are
likely of little use to those serving as pundits rather than as
reporters.8
5. Erwin Chemerinsky & Laurie Levenson, The Ethics of Being a Com-
mentator, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1303 (1996).
6. We believe that this code should be voluntary because any enforcement
of such a code would raise serious free speech problems in that the code is di-
rected at the content of the commentators' remarks. See id. at 1314-18. Our
hope is that commentators will choose to follow such a code and that the media
will ask their commentators to comply.
7. However, we suggest below that some of the basic duties contained in
codes of professional responsibility, such as the obligation to protect client confi-
dences, can conflict with lawyers serving as commentators. For example, as
discussed below, we are deeply troubled by how attorneys in the Simpson crimi-
nal trial have become commentators in the civil proceedings. See infra text ac-
companying notes 22-29.
8. To the extent that journalists embrace a code of ethics, it is a voluntary
one ordinarily imposed just by an individual employing media outlet. See
BRUCE M. SWAIN, REPORTERS' ETHIcs 111 (1978).
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A voluntary code of ethics for commentators could serve
many purposes. Ideally, it would offer guidance to those serv-
ing as commentators in the future. We have constantly been
confronted with difficult ethical issues in our role as commen-
tators. The shared wisdom of those who have been in this
role might offer assistance to those who will serve as com-
mentators in the future by helping them to recognize and re-
solve ethical issues. As is true for codes of ethics in all fields,
such a code can help to raise the professional quality of be-
havior by helping individuals identify ethical issues and by
setting minimum standards.
A code of ethics might also give guidance to the news me-
dia in using commentators and certainly can help the com-
mentator in explaining to the media what is the appropriate
and inappropriate role for the pundit. Such a code also can
lead to more consistency among commentators as they can be
guided by a common set of standards.
Perhaps above all, a code of ethics for commentators can
demonstrate that commentators take their ethical obligations
seriously. The public's general cynicism towards the legal
profession certainly has carried over to commentators. Many
of the attorneys in the Simpson criminal case have directed
their greatest ire towards the pundits. Simpson defense at-
torney Barry Scheck, for example, declared: "If this case has
fostered disrespect for the system, it's [because of] the TV
coverage.... The whole new industry of commentators pro-
motes cynicism, and I speak as one of the original commenta-
tors on Court TV. There's no presumption of innocence,
there's snap judgments."9 A code of ethics is a way of ad-
dressing these criticisms and demonstrating that commenta-
tors are cognizant of their important role as public educators.
Rather than repeat what we said in our earlier article,
this essay focuses on topics not previously addressed. Part II
returns to the issue of competence of commentators. How,
particularly now in this post-Simpson era when high profile
trials are not being televised, can a commentator perform his
or her role competently? Should there be a requirement that
commentators attend proceedings or is there another way for
commentators to stay abreast of developments in a case?
9. Marc Fisher, A Case that Courts Criticism: Simpson Trial Brings Callsfor Legal Reforms, WASH. POST, May 22, 1995, at Al.
[Vol. 37
COMMENTATOR ETHICS
What does it mean for a commentator to be competent to ana-
lyze a case?
Part III considers additional questions concerning con-
flicts of interest. Is there a danger in a lawyer on a case be-
coming a commentator for a related trial? How do a commen-
tator's conflicts of interest implicate a lawyer's traditional
duties of loyalty and confidentiality to a former client? Can a
commentator serve two masters-the public and the client?
Finally, Part IV focuses on remedies available for a com-
mentator's unethical behavior. What steps can and should
commentators take to enforce a voluntary code of ethics? Is it
incumbent on a commentator to report another commenta-
tor's violations? Is resignation the best solution for commen-
tators embroiled in an ethical dilemma? How do a commen-
tator's responsibilities as an officer of the court influence his
or her actions?
At its heart, our effort is guided by one overriding princi-
ple-the belief that what commentators do matters. A com-
mentator's words and opinions are often heard or read by mil-
lions of people. They thus shape how people understand and
view the legal system. A commentator's words may also mat-
ter to the participants in a case. It is not unheard of for
judges to follow legal commentary and tailor their rulings ac-
cordingly.1 ° Trial participants sometimes use commentary to
guide what arguments or strategies they will present in
court. While heard outside the courtroom, a commentator's
voice can nonetheless have an impact inside the trial.
At its best, legal commentary educates the public, engen-
ders respect for the legal profession and the judicial system,
10. The most striking example of this occurred during the O.J. Simpson
civil case. At least two times, Judge Fujisaki reversed himself or backtracked
on controversial rulings shortly after they were made. This first occurred when
the judge allowed plaintiffs counsel to examine Mr. Simpson on a polygraph
test he allegedly failed. The general consensus of legal commentators was that
the court's ruling was questionable at best. The court began the next court ses-
sion with a cautionary instruction that the results of the polygraph should not
be considered by the jury. Days later, the court admitted testimony from a
counselor at a battered women's shelter regarding a call from a "Nicole" in
which the caller describes stalking and threats from her former husband. Once
again, after a night of commentators' criticisms, the court sought to limit the
impact of this evidence with a cautionary instruction. While it could just be
coincidence that the court reconsidered the same issues that commentators had
questioned, it may also be that the media and commentators had an impact on
court rulings.
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and helps to facilitate needed reforms.11 At its worst, legal
commentary misinforms the public and increases cynicism to-
wards lawyers and courts.12 Because the potential effects are
so great, it is imperative that there be a voluntary code of
ethics to guide commentators and the media.
II. DUTY TO ACT COMPETENTLY
In our previous article, we recognized as foremost the
commentator's duty to act competently. 13 Unless a commen-
tator knows and understands both the legal and factual is-
sues in a case, that person cannot provide helpful or even fair
commentary regarding a case.
During the O.J. Simpson criminal case, it was fairly sim-
ple for a legal commentator to stay abreast of the proceed-
ings. All one needed to do was turn on the television or link
into simultaneously transmitted transcripts and one could
follow every word of the case. However, access to high-profile
cases has been restricted considerably in response to the
Simpson criminal case. Most courts in high-profile cases are
not allowing the proceedings to be broadcast. As a result, the
task of the commentator in staying informed has become
much more difficult.
Even for those commentators who have the time and
commitment to attend the court's proceeding, there is rarely
open access. Typically, the court will allot seats for the pub-
lic, family members, and the media. The commentator is left
to beg. Excluded by court personnel from being considered
members of the public,' 4 commentators must hope that mem-
bers of the media will share media seats with the commenta-
tors. While many do, the commentator's access to the actual
court proceedings, especially during the testimony of key wit-
nesses, can be greatly limited.
11. See Laurie L. Levenson, Reporting the Rodney King Trial: The Role of
Legal Experts, 27 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 649 (1994).
12. Id.
13. Chemerinsky & Levenson, supra note 5, at 1319.
14. The court's media liaison has the power to designate who is considered
a member of the press and who is eligible for a public seat. While in the past
these individuals have allowed legal commentators to stand in line for public
tickets, more recently commentators have been excluded from the public's
ranks if they ever enter on a media pass. We believe that this discrimination
against commentators in attending court proceedings raises serious First
Amendment issues that are beyond the scope of this paper.
918 [Vol. 37
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One alternative that has often been available to legal
commentators is access to a media listening room. From a
location outside of the courtroom, commentators and report-
ers sit and listen to the proceedings.15 While better than no
access, listening rooms still leave commentators without the
ability to comment on the demeanor of courtroom partici-
pants, including witnesses. Just because a commentator is
competent to discuss the substance of questioning, it does not
follow that the commentator is competent to answer ques-
tions regarding the tenor of the courtroom or the demeanor of
participants inside of it.
It takes time, work and perseverance for a commentator
to stay competent to comment regarding a case. With limited
access to a proceeding, it may be important for a commenta-
tor to limit his or her subjects of commentary. On legal issues
that can be researched, such as whether lie detector results
are admissible in a civil proceeding, the commentator may
still be able to provide helpful perspective. However, with re-
gard to questions regarding witness demeanor or the effec-
tiveness of a party's strategy, the commentator should ab-
stain from commenting if he or she did not witness the
proceedings. Moreover, even if the commentator did attend
the proceedings, he or she must keep in mind that the jurors
may focus on different things than the media or commenta-
tors attending the trial. Thus, the commentator should avoid
speculating on the actual impact of the court proceedings on
the jury.
There is also a dangerous tendency among legal commen-
tators to believe that just because they witness a prior pro-
ceeding regarding a case, they are competent to comment on
follow-up proceedings. While many of the same witnesses
may testify in both proceedings, small differences in their tes-
timony may affect the outcome of a case. In the Simpson civil
case, there were repeatedly differences in witnesses' testi-
mony from the criminal trial-some subtle and some not. If
a commentator is operating from old information, that person
is not necessarily competent to comment on the new case.
15. For example, when O.J. Simpson took the witness stand during his civil
trial, the audio trailer looked like a convention of legal commentators. At least
twenty legal commentators converged on the trailer for an opportunity to hear,
if not see, Simpson testify.
91919971
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Another trap we have seen is a commentator's reliance
on the parties to "fill in" the commentator on interesting de-
velopments in a case. It is doubtful that a lawyer zealously
representing a client is going to provide balanced, objective
information to a commentator who can help shape public
opinion on a case. A commentator who seeks to perform com-
petently should not rely on a party to educate him or her on a
case. The commentator must conduct a separate review of
the proceedings.
One particular issue that has arisen recently is whether
commentators who comment on reenactments of a trial pro-
vide competent, useful commentary or are instead engaged in
an activity that is inherently misleading to the public. Dur-
ing the Simpson civil trial, the E! Entertainment Network
has provided daily delayed reenactments of the civil trial. Ac-
tors resembling the participants in the trial, including thejudge, lawyers, witnesses and parties, recite portions of the
trial taken from the daily trial transcript. A lawyer who at-
tends the trial regularly guides the director in selecting ex-
cerpts for presentation on the show. He also assists the ac-
tors in deciding how to play their parts during the recreation.
While there has been some criticism by the news indus-
try of E!'s recreation of the trial proceedings,1" we do not be-
lieve that a commentator automatically acts improperly by
commenting on such recreations. We see no problems with
reenactments so long as the passages are read verbatim, in
proper context, and in a manner that reflects the tenor of the
actual events. Rather, the same standards for competence
would seem to apply to recreations as apply when the com-
mentator is asked to speak generally regarding a proceeding.
The commentator should know from either personal observa-
tion of the proceedings or a personal review of the transcripts
what occurred in the case. Then, the commentator can ad-
dress candidly whether the recreations are informative to the
public or misleading. The commentator can only help the
viewing audience put matters into context if the commentator
is operating from direct firsthand knowledge of the trial and
not through recreations.
16. See Greg Braxton, For Hard-Core Trial Buffs, It's Virtual O.J. T.V.:
Cable Channel E! Reenacts Highlights from Civil Trial, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 9,
1996, at Home Ed. 1; Howard Rosenberg, Television: Reenactments No Substi-
tute for Real Life, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1996 at Fl.
920 [Vol. 37
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Finally, we have come to learn that being a competent
commentator often involves knowing information that occurs
outside the four walls of the courtroom. For example, a key
issue in the Simpson civil trial was how that case would be
affected by a custody ruling in another court. Similarly, the
question arose as to how information in the many books writ-
ten on the trial might impact the trial strategy or behavior of
potential witnesses. The competent commentator must study
a case from many perspectives if, for no other reasons, to un-
derstand the many prisms through which the media and pub-
lic are interpreting the developments in a case. Because a
commentator's life experiences may influence how he or she
views a case, it is also important for a commentator to be sen-
sitive to the perspective of those from different back-
grounds-ethnic, economic and professional. Likewise, the
media would be well-served to recruit commentators with di-
verse backgrounds so that the public can receive differing
perspectives regarding a case.
Competency is still the number one priority for all com-
mentators. As we have stated before, there is no set formula
for a commentator to act competently. However, familiarity
with a case, a willingness to research exhaustively, and prior
experience with the courts all are essential to being a compe-
tent commentator. Also crucial is care in answering ques-
tions. There are some questions that can be answered solely
from legal research and some that require attendance in the
courtroom.
III. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
In our earlier essay we discussed several conflicts of in-
terest that might arise while serving in the role of commenta-
tor. For example, we considered conflicts created by a com-
mentator's personal relationship with lawyers in a case. At a
minimum, we concluded that an individual should not serve
as a commentator if he or she has done any work on the case
and that any personal relationship with the participants be
fully disclosed.1 7
We also expressed concern about conflicts created by a
commentator's stake in the outcome of the proceedings or by
a ruling on a legal issue. For instance, the issue might arise
17. Chemerinsky & Levenson, supra note 5, at 1328-29.
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as to whether the prosecution should seek death penalty in a
particular case. If the legal commentator is currently work-
ing on a case in which the district attorney is being asked to
compare facts and decide whether the death penalty is appro-
priate, there is a clear conflict of interest for the commenta-
tor. We believe that in such an instance the lawyer should
not serve as a commentator.18
Additionally, we considered conflicts created by a com-
mentator's political or organizational affiliation, conflicts cre-
ated when speaking to more than one media outlet, conflicts
created by contacting a represented party, and conflicts cre-
ated by assisting the court. In each instance we stressed that
the commentator has the duty to identify the conflict, to re-
fuse to serve (or not be used) as a commentator if the conflict
would prevent him or her from being a neutral analyst, and
to disclose all conflicts to the media and ideally to the
public. 19
The assumption throughout our earlier discussion was
that commentators have a duty of neutrality. Recent events,
especially the commentary on Proposition 209 and the large
number of attorneys from the Simpson criminal case serving
as commentators in the civil case, have caused us to reexam-
ine the idea of neutrality. Additionally, the experience in the
Simpson civil case raises issues of loyalty and protection of
client confidences when an attorney in a case becomes a com-
mentator in a subsequent related proceeding. A third set of
new conflicts issues concerns how commentators should deal
with trial participants who are covered by a gag order. These
events also again raise the question of how much, if at all,
commentators should interact with the parties, attorneys,
and witnesses in the case. Each of these issues is discussed
in turn.
A. Is There a Duty of Neutrality?
The media and the public generally look to the commen-
tator to provide a neutral opinion as to the law and an unbi-
ased assessment of the events in a case. Neutrality in this
context means that the commentator should not act, or be
perceived as acting, as an advocate for either side in a pro-
18. Id. at 1330.
19. Id. at 1330-33.
922 [Vol. 37
COMMENTATOR ETHICS
ceeding. Absent gag orders on the attorneys, the media can
turn to the lawyers for each side to explain their actions and
their assessments. The commentator's contribution is as an
independent party without ties to either side in the proceed-
ings. Indeed, it is likely that commentators are used by the
media, in part, to enhance the credibility of coverage.
Yet, recent events have challenged whether this assump-
tion of neutrality is warranted or appropriate. Many of the
attorneys from the Simpson criminal case, such as Christo-
pher Darden, Alan Dershowitz, Barry Scheck, and Robert
Shapiro, appeared as commentators during the civil trial.
Surely they cannot be neutral or be perceived as acting in a
neutral fashion. A lawyer has a continuing duty of loyalty to
former clients.2" It would be a breach of this duty of loyalty if
a criminal defense attorney who helped to secure an acquittal
later expressed the view that his or her client was guilty.
Moreover, the problems with commentators being neu-
tral can arise even where the individual was not an attorney
in the earlier proceedings. What if the commentator has
strong views on the issues presented in a case? To again use
the Simpson case as an example, virtually everyone has an
opinion as to whether O.J. Simpson killed Ronald Goldman
and Nicole Brown Simpson. It would seem inevitable that
commentary would be influenced by these views. Does this
impermissibly conflict with the commentators duty of
neutrality?
We also observed and experienced the same problem in
providing commentary on the legal proceedings surrounding
Proposition 209, the California initiative that abolished af-
firmative action. Each of us frequently spoke against Propo-
sition 209 prior to the November 1996 election. The day after
it was approved by the voters, the American Civil Liberties
Union led a coalition of civil rights groups in filing a legal
challenge to the constitutionality of Proposition 209. Imme-
diately, we began to receive media calls to explain and assess
the basis for the constitutional challenge. We were not serv-
ing as attorneys in the case, but we were not neutral either.
We were thus troubled by whether we could fulfill the duty of
neutrality that our earlier article advocated.
20. See, e.g., Trone v. Smith, 621 F.2d 994, 998-99 (9th Cir. 1980) (describ-
ing duty of loyalty to former clients); see also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.9 (1996) ("Conflict of Interest: Former Client").
92319971
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On reflection, the problem of neutrality seems far more
difficult than we previously recognized. It is simply unrealis-
tic to expect commentators to approach a matter without
views or to pretend that such opinions will not influence the
commentary provided. Everyone has an opinion as to
whether Simpson committed the murders and everyone has
an opinion as to whether Proposition 209 is desirable. If neu-
trality requires the absence of views, no one could serve as a
commentator.
But the conclusion should not be that neutrality is irrele-
vant simply because it is impossible. If the media and the
public are looking at a commentator as a neutral expert, that
trust is breached when the commentator is serving as an ad-
vocate for a particular position. Reporters are expected to
adopt a neutral posture even though they too undoubtedly
have views and opinions about what they are covering.
The initial solution to the problem would seem to be dis-
closure. The commentator could be required to disclose any
prior involvements or views that would preclude neutrality.
Indeed, disclosure is required in the practice of law when
there is a potential conflict of interest. For instance, the Cali-
fornia Rule of Professional Conduct, 3-310(B), concerning
neutrality is specific and might be a model in dealing with
disclosure by commentators:
A member shall not accept or continue representation of a
client without providing written disclosure to the client
where:
(1) The member has a legal, business, financial, profes-
sional or personal relationship with a party or witness in
the same matter; or (2) The member knows or reasonably
should know that:
(a) the member previously had a legal, business, fi-
nancial, professional or personal relationship with a party
or witness in the same matter; and
(b) the previous relationship would substantially af-
fect the member's representation; or
(3) The member has or had a legal, business, financial,
professional, or personal relationship with another person
or entity the member knows or reasonably should know
would be affected substantially by resolution of the mat-
ter; or
[Vol. 37
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(4) The member has or had a legal, business, financial, or
professional interest in the subject matter of the
represention. 2
1
This provision conceivably could be applied, almost ver-
batim, to commentators. If commentators have disclosed
such biases, they will not be perceived as neutral experts and
the public thus will not be misled. With disclosure, the public
can better understand and appraise the commentator's
remarks.
However, there are many problems with disclosure in the
context of serving as a commentator. First and most impor-
tantly, the commentator's disclosure likely will not be com-
municated to the public. The commentator certainly can dis-
close these matters to the reporter conducting the interview,
but it is highly unlikely that any of it will be conveyed to pub-
lic. There is simply not space in a newspaper story or time on
a news broadcast for the media to make such disclosures
about its commentators. This does not mean that disclosure
to the media is unimportant. The media should know of a
commentator's potential conflicts in deciding whether to use
the individual as an analyst. But even if the commentator
urges disclosure to the public, usually the realities of space
and time constraints will make this unlikely.
Second, even if disclosures occur, it is still unclear as to
what must be communicated. Does every commentator in
every interview have the duty to say whether he believes that
Simpson committed the murders? Although such a view may
influence the commentary, the usual reaction to such expres-
sion of opinion would be that the commentator should stick to
answering the particular question posed.
Third, reporters do not make such disclosures, so why
should commentators? Reporters undoubtedly also have
opinions as to Simpson's guilt or about Proposition 209. They
do not disclose these views, even though they certainly affect
reporting. It is unclear why commentators should be held to
a higher standard.
Finally, such disclosures may be unnecessary in some in-
stances, such as where every one knows of the commentator's
prior involvement. For instance, on some shows it is highly
likely that the audience knows that Christopher Darden and
21. CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3-310(B) (1996).
9251997l
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
Alan Dershowitz were attorneys in the criminal trial and are
not neutral experts in the civil case. Nor, of course, is the
media turning to such lawyers as neutral experts. The for-
mer trial participants are used because of the personal
knowledge they have of the case and the hope that their fame
will attract additional viewers.
Ultimately, there is no perfect solution to the problem of
commentator neutrality. Certain minimum steps can be
taken, however, to enhance neutrality and the public percep-
tion of neutrality.
1. Commentators should disclose to the media and to the
reporter any current or prior legal, business, financial, pro-
fessional or personal relationship with a party or witness in
the case.
2. The media should disclose to the public such a rela-
tionship when using the commentator. For instance, those
who previously were attorneys in a case should be identified
as such.
3. The commentator should identify, in his or her own
mind, whether he or she is being used by the media as an
advocate or as a neutral expert. If the commentator is being
used as a neutral expert, the commentator should strive to be
fair and balanced. If the commentator is unable to do this,
then he or she should not be used in the role of neutral ex-
pert. In other words, if the commentator sees himself or her-
self being used in the role of neutral analyst, then the com-
mentator should strive to fulfill this role. The task of the
reporter generally includes a duty of neutrality and reporters
are asked to set aside their own feelings and opinions to the
greatest extent possible. Commentators performing the role
of neutral experts should be asked to do the same.
4. If a commentator is to serve in a neutral role, he or
she should avoid seeking special favors from the parties
which would give the appearance that the lawyer is aligned
with one side or another. For example, the commentator
should not attend the trial as the "guest" of one side or the
other, but rather as a member of the media or the public.
B. Attorneys Transformed Into Commentators: The
Problem of Confidentiality
There is, however, an even more significant problem
when an attorney on a case becomes a commentator in a re-
[Vol. 37
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lated proceeding: the difficulty in preserving client confi-
dences. Attorneys must forever keep secret what they learn
in the course of the attorney-client relationship. The Califor-
nia Business and Professional Code, for example, says that
"It is the duty of the attorney... [t]o maintain inviolate the
confidence, and at every peril to himself or herself to preserve
the secrets, of his or her client."2 2 The Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct command that "[a] lawyer shall not reveal in-
formation relating to representation of a client unless the cli-
ent consents after consultation."
23
There is no doubt that an attorney's duty to protect client
confidences continues even after the representation ends.24
Many problems therefore arise when an attorney in a case
becomes a commentator in a related proceeding, such as
when the lawyers from the Simpson criminal case became
commentators in the civil proceedings. At the very least,
there is the danger that confidential information will be inad-
vertently disclosed. Consider, for example, if a former lawyer
is asked how his former client will fare during cross-examina-
tion or what the best technique would be for opposing counsel
to question him? Live television requires instantaneous an-
swers with little or no time for reflection. The human mind
does not neatly separate information by its sources. The com-
mentator will not have the luxury of carefully reflecting on
the source of the information and deciding whether the dis-
closure will breach a duty to protect confidences. As a result,
the commentator will have a difficult choice: say very little so
as to stay clear from areas that might lead to inadvertent dis-
closures of confidential information or make remarks that
create a serious risk of breaching confidentiality.25
22. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e) (West 1996).
23. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1996).
24. We are thus very troubled by the instances in which attorneys for O.J.
Simpson spoke to reporters and authors and disclosed information that seems
clearly protected as confidential. See, e.g., LAURENCE SCHILLER & JAMES
WILLWERTH, AMERICAN TRAGEDY: THE UNCENSORED STORY OF THE SIMPSON DE-
FENSE (1996). Unless Simpson executed a waiver, statements by his lawyers
that were detrimental to Simpson were a breach of loyalty and any disclosure of
confidential information would appear to be a violation of the attorney's obliga-
tion to protect such material even after the completion of the trial. This issue,
however, is beyond the scope of this paper because the lawyers were not serving
as commentators in their remarks to authors or reporters.
25. It must be remembered that a lawyer is barred not only from revealing
information protected by the attorney-client privilege (i.e., "confidential" infor-
mation), but also information gained in the professional relationship that the
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One solution to this problem might be to remind the com-
mentator of the fundamental duty to protect client confi-
dences and then trust the individual to observe this com-
mand. However, such trust is not regarded as adequate
protection for confidentiality in other contexts. For instance,
the strict rules concerning imputed disqualification are based
on an unwillingness to leave protection of client confidences
to trust in attorneys' good judgment. The Model Rules, and
every code of ethics, provide that "[wihile lawyers are associ-
ated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a cli-
ent when any one of them practicing alone would be prohib-
ited from doing so."26 Underlying the rule of imputed
disqualification is the concern that attorneys might inadver-
tently disclose confidential information to others in their of-
fices. The solution is a strict prohibition on situations where
such disclosure might occur.
Moreover, as alluded to above, such trust seems espe-
cially misplaced where the setting will allow no time for re-
flection and care in protecting client confidences. Inadvertent
disclosure seems an inherent and substantial risk.
Therefore, our recommendation is that an attorney not
serve as a commentator where he or she served as a lawyer in
a substantially related proceeding unless the client expressly
consents in writing. "Substantial relationship" should be de-
fined as it is in the current rules and cases dealing with when
an attorney is disqualified from successive representation.
The classic statement of the substantial relationship test was
client has either requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be
embarrassing or would be likely be detrimental to the client ("secrets"). See
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(A) (1996). The strat-
egy in cross-examining an individual would undoubtedly consider, consciously
or subconsciously, a focus on the client's weaknesses as known by confidential
or secret information.
26. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10 (1996).
27. See, e.g., Analytica, Inc. v. NPD Research, Inc., 708 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir.
1983) ("[A] lawyer may not represent an adversary of his former client if the
subject matter of the two representations is 'substantially related,' which
means if the lawyer could have obtained confidential information in the first
representation that could have been relevant in the second. It is irrelevant
whether he actually obtained such information and used it against his former
client, or whether-if the lawyer in a firm rather than an individual practi-
tioner-different people in the firm handled the matter and scrupulously
avoided discussing them."); see also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 1.9 (1996) (disqualifying subsequent representation when there is a sub-
stantial relationship).
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Judge Weinfeld's statement in T.C. Theatre v. Warner Bros.
Pictures:
[Wihere any substantial relationship can be shown be-
tween the subject matter of a former representation and
that of a subsequent adverse representation, the latter
will be prohibited .... [T]he former client need show no
more than that the matters embraced within the pending
suit wherein his former attorney appears on behalf of his
adversary are substantially related to the matters or
cause of action wherein the attorney previously repre-
sented him, the former client. The Court will assume that
during the course of the former representation confidences
were disclosed to the attorney bearing on the subject mat-
ter of the representation.28
Under this standard, we believe that the lawyers from the
Simpson criminal case should be disqualified from serving as
commentators in the civil proceedings unless they receive ex-
press written consent from their former client.
Yet, we recognize that some lawyers and members of the
media are unlikely to observe this recommendation. For at-
torneys, the chance to serve as commentators likely has ap-
peal in terms of exposure, possibly income, and enjoyment.
For the media, it is the opportunity to present a "name" that
might attract viewers or readers, perhaps with the possibility
that inside information might be disclosed.
Therefore, although we advocate a provision that prohib-
its individuals from serving as commentators on matters sub-
stantially related to those where they served as attorneys, we
also think that there must be a reaffirmation of the duty to
protect client confidences if such attorneys become commen-
tators. Even when a lawyer from a substantially related case
ill-advisedly chooses to act as a legal commentator, the safe-
guards for confidences still can be strictly enforced by bar dis-
ciplinary proceedings or suits for breach of fiduciary duty if a
breach occurs.
Additionally, we strongly advocate that a lawyer not
serve as a commentator when it appears that he or she could
be a witness in a proceeding. The ABA Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct have a prohibition against a person serving as
both a lawyer and witness in the same proceeding, unless the
testimony relates to an uncontested issue, relates to the na-
28. 113 F. Supp. 265, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
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ture and value of services or disqualification of the lawyer
would work a hardship on the client.29 The same type of rule
should apply to legal commentators. Practically, it will be
impossible for a commentator to have even an appearance of
neutrality when he or she is a participant in a trial. How, for
example, would the commentator respond when asked what
type of impact his or her testimony will have on the proceed-
ings or whether the testimony was credible? A lawyer who
was a percipient witness to events relating to a case, includ-
ing events in a prior, related case, should ordinarily forego
the role as an objective legal commentator. A legal commen-
tator should discuss the news, not be the news.
C. Dealing with Participants Covered by Gag Orders
Increasingly judges in high profile cases are imposing
gag orders on attorneys and parties. For example, the attor-
neys and the parties in the O.J. Simpson civil case and the
pending Oklahoma City bombing prosecution are covered by
broad court orders preventing public statements about the
litigation. Although the United States Supreme Court has
not yet ruled on the constitutionality of such prior re-
straints,3 ° several lower courts have upheld them as a way of
balancing the right to a fair trial with the rights of the
press.3 1 Elsewhere we have argued against such gag or-
ders.2 Our focus here, though, is not on the desirability of
29. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.7 (1996).
30. In Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976), the Supreme
Court considered gag orders on the press and disapproved them except in ex-
traordinary circumstances. In Gentile v. State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991), the
Court considered the constitutional standard for when attorneys may be disci-
plined for their speech about a pending case. Neither case, however, considered
the constitutionality of a court order limiting attorney speech.
31. See, e.g., United States v. Cutler, 840 F. Supp. 959 (E.D. N.Y.), affd, 58
F.3d 825 (2d Cir. 1995); Levine v. United States, 764 F.2d 590 (9th Cir. 1985);
In re Russell, 726 F.2d 1007 (4th Cir. 1984); United States v. Tijernia, 412 F.2d
661 (10th Cir. 1969). But see United States v. Ford, 830 F.2d 596 (6th Cir.
1987) (holding a gag order on lawyers unconstitutional). See also Eileen A.
Minnefor, Looking for Fair Trials in the Information Age: The Need for More
Stringent Gag Orders on Trial Participants, 30 U.S.F. L. REV. 95 (1995) (de-
fending increased use of gag orders); Mark R. Stabile, Free Press-Fair Trial:
Can They Be Reconciled in a Highly Publicized Case, 79 GEO. L.J. 337 (1990).
32. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Lawyers Have Free Speech Rights Too: Why
Gag Orders on Trial Participants Are Almost Always Unconstitutional, LOYOLA
OF L.A. ENT. L.J. (forthcoming 1997).
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such orders, but rather on the ethical problems that they pose
for the commentator.
An argument can be made that lawyers who serve as
commentators remain officers of the court. Accordingly, they
should be respectful of court orders and not participate in any
activity that would violate such an order. From this perspec-
tive, commentators should refrain from conversations with
trial participants about the case or that might yield com-
ments that are inconsistent with the gag order. Further-
more, if the commentator obtains such remarks from the at-
torneys or parties, the analyst is transformed into more of a
reporter than a member of the legal profession commenting
on the gathered information.
We have grave concerns about the dangers to commenta-
tors in gathering information and thus serving more as re-
porters than independent analysts. There is always the dan-
ger that the attorneys or parties will use the commentator by
providing information, even potentially inaccurate state-
ments, that they wish to reach the media and the public.
There is also the danger that the analyst's comments will be
tempered or influenced by the desire to maintain the relation-
ship with the source. This is obviously a constant risk for re-
porters, but it is an even greater danger for commentators
who are asked to analyze and appraise.
But a blanket prohibition on commentator contact with
attorneys and parties, even when they are covered by gag or-
ders, seems undesirable. The commentator is not covered by
the court's prior restraint and does not violate it by speaking
to the attorneys and parties. The burden is on the attorneys
and parties under the court's order to comply with it.
Whether to speak with attorneys and parties is a judg-
ment call for the commentator. Commentators should not
knowingly encourage others to violate the law, including a
court order. However, that does not mean a commentator is
barred from all conversation with a party or attorney under a
gag order. If a party to a gag order is willing to provide infor-
mation to a person affiliated with the press, and the commen-
tator has identified himself or herself as such, then the com-
mentator is entitled to listen to that information. When
doing so, however, the commentator must always remember
that the parties may be using the commentator to dissemi-
nate prejudicial information. Additionally, by cozying up to a
19971
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party to gain forbidden access, the commentator may be sac-
rificing his or her appearance as a neutral analyst.33
IV. REMEDIES
The last challenge remaining for those of us committed to
a voluntary code of ethics is to develop avenues of enforce-
ment outside of a formal system of discipline.3 a What
2remedies are available when there appears to be a breach of
ethics by a legal commentator? What should a commentator
do when he or she perceives that the media is acting
unethically?
A. Media Commitment
Unless the media is committed to using ethical commen-
tators, the effort to improve standards for commentators is
unlikely to succeed. Sensational reports by big name lawyers
may draw strong television ratings even if the public is being
cheated in the information it receives. The best way to en-
sure that legal commentators will act in a responsible and
ethical manner is to encourage media outlets to adopt ethical
standards for their legal commentators.
As of yet, there seems to be no formal movement in this
direction. Because of the media's belief that it should be able
to do all that the First Amendment allows, the media has re-
frained from adopting for itself a formal code of ethics.
Rather, the preservation of ethical standards seems to be in
the hands of individual journalists who are themselves sub-
ject to the commercial pressures of the media business. We
have met many fine journalists who, as individuals, would
love to elevate the ethical standards for their reporting of
high-profile cases. But, as part of the front line team, they
33. The commentator should always consider how it will appear if the com-
mentator is called as a witness in a contempt hearing before the court for a
violation of a gag order. Although the commentator may also be covered by the
shield laws, the neutrality of the commentator is sure to be challenged and the
court is likely to publicly criticize the commentator for encouraging a violation
of a court order.
34. It must always be remembered, however, that a legal commentator may
be subject to discipline to the extent that his or her remarks violate professional
codes of ethics for attorneys. For example, even though the Code of Ethics for
Legal Commentators may be a voluntary one, every attorney is bound by duties
of confidentiality and loyalty that are the subject of mandatory and enforceable
codes. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068 et seq. (West 1996).
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rarely have the final say in what will be reported by their
agency. Rather, a team of editors or producers, less familiar
with the proceedings and participants, ends up making the
final editorial decisions.
Interestingly, if the media were to follow the ethical
model of lawyers, those with supervisory authority would
have primary responsibility to ensure that those reporters on
the front line use all reasonable efforts to conform to stan-
dards of professional conduct.35 This supervisory responsibil-
ity does not discharge line reporters and commentators from
acting in an ethical manner. Rather, it is an additional
means of enforcement.
We strongly encourage the media, whether it be the indi-
vidual reporter assigned to a case or the supervisors behind
the scene, to insist on the highest ethical standards for their
legal commentators. The public will be better served by these
requirements and so will the media. One of the most effective
remedies for unethical behavior by a commentator is the me-
dia declining to give that commentator an avenue to express
his or her views.
B. Pressure from Above?
Assuming, however, that the media is unable or unwill-
ing to monitor the ethical behavior of lawyers, what are the
responsibilities of the individual commentator if he or she is
being asked to participate in unethical behavior by a media
organization? At their essence, even mandatory codes of eth-
35. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.1(a) provides:
(a) A partner in a law firm shall make reasonable efforts to en-
sure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable
assurance that all lawyers in the firm conform to the rules of
professional conduct.
(b) A lawyer having direct supervisory authority over another
lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the other
lawyer conforms to the rules of professional conduct.
(c) A lawyer shall be responsible for another lawyer's violation of
the rules of professional conduct if:
(1) the lawyer orders, or with knowledge of the specific con-
duct, ratifies the conduct involved; or
(2) the lawyer is a partner in the law firm in which the other
lawyer practices, or has direct supervisory authority over
the other lawyer, and knows of the conduct at a time
when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but
fails to take reasonable remedial action.
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ics rely heavily on the personal commitment of its profession-
als to comply with the code's ethical standards. Some codes
even require self-reporting of violations. 6
If a legal commentator is under immediate pressure to
act in an unethical manner, it is the personal responsibility of
that commentator to uphold the ethics of the profession. It
does not matter that the commentator is acting in great part
at the direction of another person. There is no "Nuremberg
Defense" for legal commentators. A legal commentator
should not be able to argue, "I was just doing what the re-
porter asked me to do." Rather, we should embrace a stan-
dard similar to that set forth in ABA Model Rule of Profes-
sional Conduct 5.2(a): "[a] lawyer is bound by the rules of
professional conduct notwithstanding that the lawyer acted
at the direction of another person."37
If a voluntary code of ethics for legal commentators is go-
ing to work, it will depend on the personal commitment of
those who serve in that role. Commentators must not abdi-
cate their ethics to others with whom they work. Ultimately,
it is the commentator's individual reputation, as well as other
legal professionals in the same position, that is at stake. To
give a simple example: we strongly believe that commenta-
tors should refuse to give predictions as to a jury's likely ver-
dict. Even when asked or pressured for such an opinion, it is
the commentator's duty to refuse and explain the inappropri-
ateness and impossibility of such forecasts.
There are also some practical steps a commentator may
take to ensure that comments are not taken out of context or
used in an improper manner. First, a commentator should be
sensitive to whether his or her remarks will be subject to ed-
iting. Taped interviews pose more risk to commentators than
live interviews because the ultimate editorial judgment is left
with the media, not the commentator. Second, if a commen-
tator's opinion is subject to qualifications, any such qualifica-
tions should be emphasized throughout the commentator's
36. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(o) (West 1996) (requiring an
attorney to report possible ethical violations to the agency charged with attor-
ney discipline).
37. We also believe, as does Rule 5.2(b), that on arguable questions of pro-
fessional duty, there is more leeway in the commentator's action and the com-
mentator may seek input and guidance from others, including those in the jour-
nalism field.
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remarks so that they are less likely to be deleted during the
editing process.
C. Withdrawal: Resigning from the Role of Commentator
Having worked in the field, we recognize that it is not
always easy for a commentator to take an ethical stance. The
pressures to compromise can be tremendous. If a commenta-
tor is being faced with a situation where he or she is being
asked to compromise ethical standards, the only practical
remedy may be withdrawal from his or her role as a commen-
tator. Once again, the ethical standards for lawyers provide
a helpful guide for commentators who must decide whether
they should withdraw from commenting on a case because of
an ethical concern.
The ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility sets
forth conditions for mandatory and permissive withdrawal.
Mandatory withdrawal is required when the lawyer: (1)
knows that she is taking steps merely for the purpose of
harassing or maliciously injuring another person; (2) knows
that her continued employment will result in a violation of an
ethical rule; (3) has a mental or physical condition that
makes it unreasonably difficult for the lawyer to carry out the
employment effectively; or (4) is discharged by the client."
Similar rules may exist for legal commentators. If a commen-
tator is asked to comment in a way that is libelous, to com-
ment when he or she is not competent to do so, or to comment
when the conditions of the commentary, including a conflict
of interest, will require a commentator to act contrary to an
ethical rule, the commentator should withdraw, at least until
that matter is resolved.
However, in less extreme situations, there are other cir-
cumstances under which the commentator will want to con-
sider permissive withdrawal. In the ABA Model Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility, permissive withdrawal is allowed
when the client: (1) insists upon presenting a claim that is
not supported by the law; (2) personally seeks to pursue an
illegal course of conduct; (3) insists that the lawyer pursue a
course of conduct that is illegal or prohibited under the Disci-
plinary Rules; (4) otherwise makes it unreasonably difficult
38. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110(B)(1)-(4)
(1996).
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for the lawyer to carry out her employment effectively; (5) in-
sists on taking positions that are contrary to the advice of the
lawyer; or (6) deliberately disregards an obligation to pay the
lawyer's fees.3 9 A commentator may be faced with similar sit-
uations and, as suggested by the Code, withdrawal may be
the best answer to the commentator's dilemma.
We recognize, though, the difficulty with withdrawal.
Being a commentator on a high profile case likely is perceived
as enjoyable, perhaps profitable, and of relatively short dura-
tion. It asks a great deal of a person to give this up. Yet,
withdrawal as a lawyer often is required where the loss
means even more, such as when a law firm must withdraw
from representing its most lucrative client or where an in-
house counsel must literally quit in order to effectuate
withdrawal.
D. Guide the Media
Another alternative that should not be lightly dismissed
is the commentator's opportunity to convince the media out-
let to do a more responsible job reporting the case. A legal
commentator need not be a proverbial potted plant. In our
experience, news organizations will listen and respect a com-
mentator more who flags ethical concerns before they occur.
Staying with the organization and trying to guide their cover-
age can have clear advantages for both the commentator and
the media. If a commentator leaves, there is the danger that
the news organization could fill the void with someone who is
not as concerned with ethical reporting. Thus, while the com-
mentator may have a clear conscience, the public will still not
be well served. Convincing a news organization to do the
right thing has greater benefits to all involved. Before a com-
mentator withdraws, he or she should first try to correct the
ethical problem at issue.
E. Whistleblowing
In an egregious case, a commentator may also need to
consider whether outside sources should be informed about
39. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110(C) (1996).
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ethical problems in news coverage. Two particular situations
come to mind.4 °
First, consider a case in which a commentator learns that
the press organization for which he comments has illegally
obtained information regarding a case. For example, what
should a commentator do if he learns that his media organi-
zation is offering to pay sitting jurors for inside informa-
tion?4 ' As an officer of the court, the commentator cannot
participate or assist another in conduct he knows to be illegal
or fraudulent.42 If the commentator continues to comment af-
ter he knows the information has been improperly obtained,
he may be implicated in the illegal scheme. But, should the
commentator go as far as reporting the illegal activity to the
court or law enforcement?
An attorney's freedom to report illegal activity by a client
is greatly restricted by an attorney's duty of confidentiality.43
A commentator is not similarly burdened. The "client" for the
commentator is both the media and the public. Thus, there is
no direct restriction on a commentator reporting illegal be-
havior. Moreover, even under the ABA Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility, a client's plans to commit a future
crime or fraud may be revealed by a lawyer. The decision
whether to report improper behavior will surely be a difficult
one. But, as an officer of the court, a commentator may
choose to make the revelations rather than face the possibil-
ity that he will be viewed as participating in a fraud or illegal
activity.
The second "whistleblowing" situation that may arise is
when a commentator observes unethical conduct by another
commentator. For example, what if a commentator works for
the same news organization as a commentator who is either
incompetent or has a clear conflict of interest? Should the
commentator resign, continue to provide his own coverage,
40. We do not mean to suggest, however, by the use of these hypotheticals
that the organizations with which we have worked have ever engaged in these
or any other improper activities.
41. Such conduct ;vould violate CAL. PENAL CODE § 116.5 (West. Supp.
1997).
42. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(7) (1996).
43. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e) (West 1996); MODEL CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(B) (1996); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.6(a) (1996).
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report his concerns to the news organization, or make public
disclosure of the ethical problems?
Resignation is always a viable option and may, as we
have discussed, sometimes be the right decision. The more
difficult question, however, is whether, with or without resig-
nation, a commentator should report another commentator's
misconduct. It is naive to believe that a commentator who
withdraws from regular commentary will not be asked why
he or she is resigning. Thus, both commentators who with-
draw and those who stay will likely have to face the difficult
issue of whether to comment openly on another commenta-
tor's ethics.
Over the decades, jurisdictions have debated whether to
impose on lawyers a duty to report another lawyer's miscon-
duct.44 The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct and
Model Code of Professional Responsibility both have recog-
nized a duty to report substantial ethical violations by law-
yers in order to ensure enforcement of the code of ethics.4 5 In
commenting on such a rule, the drafters stated: "Self-regula-
tion of the legal professional requires that members of the
profession initiate disciplinary investigation when they know
of a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct."4 6 The
theory of a duty to report is that lawyers are in a better posi-
tion than clients or the public to know when an ethical viola-
tion is occurring and that it is therefore professionally and
morally incumbent upon them to report each other's
violations.
Many states, including California, have rejected a duty
to report others' ethical violations. Not only can such duties
create animosity among members of the Bar, but they can
also be used as harassment by one lawyer against another. A
lawyer who wishes for personal or competitive reasons to sab-
otage another lawyer's career would be encouraged to file dis-
ciplinary complaints against the other lawyer. Also, the only
way a duty to report works is to hold the lawyer who does not
report a violation also responsible for a violation of the rules.
44. See Note, "Stool Pigeon" Canons: A Comment on Certain Sections of Ca-
nons 28 and 29 of the ABA Code of Ethics, 41 CONN. B. J. 339 (1967); E. Wayne
Thode, Duty of Lawyers and Judges to Report Other Lawyers' Breaches of the
Standards of the Legal Profession, 1976 UTAH L. REV. 95 (1976).
45. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-103 (1996);
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.3(a) (1996).
46. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.3(a) (1996).
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Those who oppose duties to report fear that lawyers who tend
to give others the benefit of the doubt, or do not feel that they
have sufficient firsthand information to assert a violation,
will be unfairly punished because they are reluctant to report
on another member of the profession.
We do not advocate a mandatory duty to report when one
legal commentator believes another legal commentator is per-
forming in an unethical manner. The choice should be up to
the legal commentator. Feelings of loyalty to both a news op-
eration and the public may, at times, support a commenta-
tor's choice to speak openly about problems in another's re-
porting of a case. On the other hand, it is very difficult to
criticize another member of your profession.
In the end, it is a personal choice. But, a commentator
need not stand idly by while another commentator conducts
himself or herself in a manner that casts disrepute on the
role of commentators. A need to preserve one's own reputa-
tion may require a commentator to openly criticize another
commentator's conduct so that the public does not misinter-
pret his or her affiliation with the suspect commentator as an
endorsement of that person's improper conduct.
Finally and perhaps ironically, it may be the commenta-
tor's role as a commentator that ultimately leads to a com-
mentator reporting another's misconduct. Traditionally, the
role of a legal commentator has been not only to comment on
court proceedings, but also to evaluate how well or poorly the
press is covering a case. If candid in these comments, the
commentator may be required to speak in unflattering terms
about the work of others.
F. Summary of Remedies
Depending on the ethical problem raised, there are a host
of remedies that a legal commentator may use to ensure ethi-
cal commenting on cases. The first remedy available for a
commentator is to act in an unimpeachably ethical manner
while providing commentary, thus giving the public an un-
tainted source of analysis. Second, a commentator may bring
to the attention of news organizations problems encountered
by the commentator or others in news gathering or the re-
porting of a case. Third, a commentator may withdraw from
commenting in a case, openly disassociating from any im-
proper activities. Fourth, a commentator may publicly com-
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ment on why he or she is withdrawing from providing cover-
age of a case. Finally, a commentator, in an egregious case,
can report to proper enforcement agencies, including the
court or law enforcement, any ethical violations that rise to
the level of illegal conduct.
The one thing we have learned from being commentators
is that it is not an easy or a passive job. The tumultuous na-
ture of reporting high-profile cases requires a commentator to
be extra diligent in upholding the standards of the profession.
We therefore encourage commentators to consider ahead of
time how they will react to ethical dilemmas before they inev-
itably arise.
V. CONCLUSION
In our initial article on the ethics of legal commentators
we emphasized that our goal in writing these articles is to
spark discussion that will lead to the best, most ethical legal
commentary by members of our profession. In writing these
articles, we feared sounding sanctimonious or expressing a
"holier than thou" attitude. In reality, much of what we have
written about is a result of mistakes that we have made.
We also stated, and still strongly believe, that commenta-
tors should support each other in this challenging task and
should not, as much as possible, view each other as the com-
petition. It is worth repeating, "Fellow commentators should
be treated with courtesy and respect, even if one disagrees
with another commentator's views. A healthy debate on is-
sues is appropriate; personal attacks are not."47
We are pleased to see that the healthy debate on the role
of legal commentators continues. It would be unrealistic to
believe that guidelines for providing commentary could be de-
veloped overnight. History teaches us differently. It took the
legal profession 75 years 48 to propose the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct and many of those rules still have not
47. Chemerinsky & Levenson, supra note 5, at 1339 n. 84.
48. The ABA Canons of Professional Ethics were first adopted in 1908.
Then, in 1969, the ABA proposed the Model of Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity. It was not until 1983 that the ABA adopted the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct and, even then, debate continued among members of the drafting com-
mission as to whether the new rules should be adopted. See Theodore I. Kos-
koff, Preface, The American Lawyer's Code of Conduct, Revised Draft - May
1982, Commission on Professional Responsibility, The Roscoe Pound-American
Trial Lawyers Foundation (May 1982).
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been adopted by states and their governing bodies. Thus, we
recognize that we are just starting the long and difficult jour-
ney toward drafting a voluntary code of ethics for legal com-
mentators. It is good, however, to get a start.
In this second article, we have raised questions regard-
ing some specific issues we have seen arise for legal commen-
tators. We recognize that there are many issues that are still
waiting to be confronted. As our predecessors have warned
us, "When you write a new code, you have to be careful not
just about what you are putting in, but also about what you
are leaving out."49 By omitting the discussion of a particular
issue, we do not mean to suggest that we do not recognize it
as a problem or endorse that particular behavior. Rather, we
have tried to bring to the forefront of discussion those ethical
issues facing legal commentators that are the most pressing
today.
As evidenced from the title of his book, Dean Gerald F.
Uelmen has noted that there are many lessons to be learned
from the latest "Trial of the Century."50 We believe that one
of the most important lessons, and one that continues with
the sequel to that case and the advent of others, is that there
is a need for legal commentators to recognize and embrace a
voluntary code of ethics. Even with the courts' animosity to-
ward television cameras in the courtroom, the coverage of
high-publicity cases is not disappearing. Legal commentators
are playing as important, if not a more important, role in in-
terpreting these cases. We should do so in the most compe-
tent, ethical manner possible.
49. Koskoff, supra note 48.
50. See GERALD F. UELMEN, LESSONS FROM THE TRIAL: THE PEOPLE V. O.J.
SIMPSON (1996).
94119971

